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Equal Protection for Children of Gay and
Lesbian Parents: Challenging the Three
Pillars of Exclusion-Legitimacy, DualGender Parenting, and Biology
Catherine E. Smitht
Introduction
In 1994, Sarah and Mary fell in love. Although their state
offered no legal recognitionfor gay and lesbian couples, they moved
in together and built a life as a couple.1 Five years later, after
alternative insemination, Sarah gave birth to their child, Lucy.
Although Mary was prohibited from adopting Lucy in their state,
they raised her jointly with the intent to both be parents to Lucy
and to share equal parenting responsibilities. In 2010, Mary,
Sarah, and Lucy were in a car accident. Sarah and then elevenyear-old Lucy escaped without injury, but Mary suffered
devastating injuries and died days later.
Gay and lesbian rights litigation and scholarship offer a
broad range of theories defining, limiting, and expanding the

t. Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Institutional Diversity
and Inclusiveness, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I extend thanks to
Law and Inequality for its excellent symposium, "Family Values: Law and the
Modern American Family." Thanks to Rebecca Aviel, Nancy Ehrenreich, Jennifer
Holladay, Holning Lau, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and Shannon Minter. I would
also like to thank Diane Bull for her excellent research assistance, and the students
in my spring semester Gender, Sexuality, and the Law course for their excellent
feedback. This article is dedicated to Zoe Jane Smith-Holladay--my rowdy,
biological five-year old whose non-bio mom, Jennifer, is as much of a mom to Zoe as
I am.
1. Thirty-six states fail to provide comprehensive statewide recognition of
same-sex couples. See Mary L. Bonauto, DOMA Damages Same-Sex Families and
Their Children, 32 FAM. ADVOC., Winter 2010, at 10, 10. Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont offer same-sex
marriage; California, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington offer civil
unions or domestic partnerships. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY
AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION LAWS 1 (2010), http://www.hrc.org/
documents/Relationship_RecognitionLawsMap.pdf. Even in states that offer
same-sex marriage, same-sex families are denied federal benefits because of the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); see Bonauto,
supra, at 14.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 28:307

rights of Sarah and Mary as a same-sex couple. Far less attention
has been dedicated to exploring the rights of children of same-sex
couples, 2 many of whom, like Lucy, live in states that have
minimal, if any, legal protections against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Lucy faces a host of roadblocks in seeking many benefits and
privileges, particularly as they relate to Mary, her non-biological
lesbian parent-benefits and privileges that children of
heterosexual parents are afforded as a matter of course because of
affinity, consanguinity, or adoption. 3 Even after an eleven year
child-parent relationship defined by emotional, psychological, and
financial support, Lucy and Mary are legal strangers. 4 Before
5
Mary's death, Lucy was denied the right to be adopted by Mary.
Had Mary and Sarah split up, Lucy would not have been legally
entitled to financial support, visitation, or a custodial arrangement
with Mary. 6 Immediately after the accident, Lucy could be denied
hospital visitation for the last days of Mary's life because she
7
failed to qualify as Mary's "immediate family member."

2. For contributions to this area of scholarship, see Kathy T. Graham, Same-

Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents and Their Children's Rights as Children, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999 (2008); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Lewis A. Silverman,

Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of a
Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411 (1999).
3. For a more comprehensive discussion and list of rights, benefits, and
privileges, see Graham, supranote 2, at 1034-36; Sam Castic, The Irrationalityof a
Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, MOD. AM.,
Summer-Fall 2007, at 3, 4-6; Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective
Adoptive Parents: The Legal Battle, HUM. RTS., Spring 1999, at 7, 7-11; Jennifer L.

Rosato, Children of Same-Sex ParentsDeserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage
Presumption,44 FAM. CT. REV. 74 (2006).
4. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 447 ("Absent legal recognition of the parentchild relationship, standing is absent, and the two are legal strangers .... ")
Castic, supra note 3, at 5-6.
5. Ten states and the District of Columbia have laws permitting second-parent
adoptions by same-sex couples. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS:
(2010),
http://www.hrc.orgtdocuments/
ADOPTION
1
PARENT
SECOND
parenting-jaws maps.pdf. Within an additional fifteen states, same-sex couples
have been successful in obtaining second-parent adoptions in some jurisdictions. Id.
6. Graham, supra note 2, at 1016-19; William Mason Emnett, Queer Conflicts:

Mediating ParentingDisputes Within the Gay Community, 86 GEO. L.J. 433, 437
(1997) ("By and large, courts ... have refused to extend custody or visitation rights
to gay co-parents.").
7. Cf. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 202-03 (N.J. 2006) (recounting, in a
challenge to New Jersey's same-sex marriage ban, the denial of hospital and
medical facility privileges to same-sex partners, including an instance where one
partner gave birth to the couple's child).
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Lucy's rights after Mary's death are even bleaker. She would
not be entitled to Mary's Social Security benefits or considered an
heir to Mary's estate if Mary died intestate.8 In addition, in most
jurisdictions, Lucy would be precluded from bringing a wrongful
death claim or seeking recovery for emotional harm from potential
defendants. 9 These are simply a few of the benefits and privileges
Lucy and children like her are denied and will be denied when it
comes to their non-biological gay or lesbian parents.' 0
An underdeveloped area of sexual orientation and gender
identity scholarship is the legal rights and remedies of those who
face discrimination because of their relation to or association with
gays and lesbians, including children of same-sex families. 1 Oddly
enough, the most recent cases denying gays and lesbians the right
to marry or to adopt rely heavily on the importance of conceiving
and raising children. Yet legal doctrines on the rights of children
are rarely invoked.12
This Essay argues that there is strong precedent for children
of same-sex couples to challenge the inequalities they face because
of discrimination against their gay and lesbian parents. Although
a reasonable litigation arena for pursuing the rights of a child of
gay and lesbian parents may be in a same-sex marriage ban case,
8. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 442 (discussing Social Security benefits for
children of same-sex couples); Maureen B. Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying
to Find a Pot of Gold for Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 495,
508 (2003) ("[1]f the partner who is not legally recognized as a parent dies intestate,
his or her estate will not pass to the children because they have no legal
relationship to the partner.").
9. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 442-43; Castic, supra note 3, at 5; see also
John G. Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005) (providing an in-depth look at the unjust effects
wrongful death laws have on surviving members of same-sex couples).
10. For sources providing more comprehensive lists of rights, benefits, and
privileges, see supra note 3. For real life stories of the psychological and social toll
these denials have had on children, see Sarah Wildman, Children Speak for SameSex Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at El.
11. For an in-depth discussion of the rights of foster children of color to be
adopted by gay and lesbian parents, see Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black
Babies Out with the Bathwater: A Child-CenteredChallenge to Same-Sex Adoption
Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1 (2008). Other areas within the realm of
third-party claims could include exploring the theories on behalf of parents or other
family members who experience discrimination because of their familial connection
to someone who is lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT). There is also
room to explore associational claims by those who face discriminatory acts by virtue
of their friendship or business dealings with LGBT individuals or families.
12. See Castic, supra note 3, at 7-8 ('To the extent that the plight of the
children of same-sex couples is addressed, it is done as a secondary matter.'). For a
list of the privileges afforded heterosexual couples and mono-racial families, see
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The
Invisibility of the MultiracialFamily, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (2009).
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a claim need not be launched on such a grand scale to address the
rights of a child of same-sex parents. As explained later in this
Essay, a more direct and perhaps less controversial approach could
be a child plaintiff challenging a government denial of a privilege
or benefit, like the denial of a wrongful death recovery for the loss
of his or her non-biological gay or lesbian parent. 13 Whether
joining a marriage case or simply staking claim to a government
benefit, a child plaintiff as a litigant-standing in his or her own
right and seeking recourse for a cognizable federal or state
constitutional injury-may serve as the Achilles' heel of an already
14
faltering anti-gay rights movement.
Part I of this Essay provides a brief overview of equal
protection law and its application to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. It then describes the most prominent
rationales deployed by government defendants in same-sex
marriage cases to justify same-sex marriage prohibitions. Part II
explains the virtually non-existent status of children of same-sex
couples in equal protection law. These children are rarely
plaintiffs in same-sex marriage litigation, or in cases-outside of
the marriage context--challenging state actions that deny them
government benefits because the state fails to legally recognize the
child's relationship to his or her non-biological gay or lesbian
parent. Part II then explores government rationales from the
perspective of a child litigant denied the right to pursue a
wrongful death claim of a non-biological gay or lesbian parent, and
explains how these rationales-based in biology, legitimacy, and
dual-gender parenting-are unlikely to prevail. These rationales,
used to deny same-sex couples legal recognition of their
relationships and gay and lesbian adoptions, have withstood
rational basis review in many jurisdictions. These same rationales
are more difficult to justify when applied to child plaintiffs because
they fly in the face of existing equal protection jurisprudence
designed to protect the rights and interests of children. This Essay
briefly concludes by raising concerns about a children's rights
perspective that warrant further research and reflection.

13. A child of heterosexual parents can generally file a wrongful death claim for
the loss of either parent, whether the child's parents are married or not, as long as
paternity is established. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (allowing
illegitimate children of the deceased to recover damages in the wrongful death of
their mother); Daniels v. Greenfield, 15 So.3d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(discussing the role of paternity in a wrongful death case); Sanders v. Tillman, 245
So.2d 198 (Miss. 1971) (discussing the application of Mississippi's wrongful death
statute to the deceased's illegitimate son).
14. This Essay will not address issues of standing.
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This Essay, exploring the rights of children of same-sex
couples, comes with some caveats. First, at a glance, it may appear
to solely advocate for same-sex marriage as the legal solution.
This essay is not intended to directly advocate for same-sex
marriage. Marriage could be one solution, at least prospectively,
for children raised by many same-sex couples; however, it is not
the only solution. 15 State and federal recognition of gay and
lesbian adoptions and/or second-parent adoptions might also serve
as legal remedies. 16 The focus of this Essay is on the rights of the
child, and in that respect, it should serve as a political bridge for
advocates on both the right and the left who may reject gay and
lesbian marriage, albeit for very different reasons.
Second, by framing the discussion around a same-sex couple
with a child, this Essay is both progressive and conservative in
some aspects. It does not argue for a normative vision that offers
protection for all children, regardless of their parental or family
arrangements. 17 It offers a pragmatic approach to the disparate
treatment of children of same-sex couples. It offers a progressive
vision by challenging the hetero-normative structures of marriage
and parenting by advocating for recognition of same-sex couples
and their children. On the other hand, it is conservative by
reinforcing the very structure that privileges a two-parent
household and children in those households over other family
constructions or extended families. Yet, shattering the barriers
that prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the equal
benefits and privileges available to children of opposite-sex couples
may clear the legal pathway for a more expansive reading of
parental relationships, responsibilities, and obligations for other
children whose parents also fail to conform to the traditional
nuclear family. 18 A focus on the rights of children of same-sex
parents could be the route to same-sex marriage or second parent
15. Marriage recognition would seem to be the most practical solution for
governments attempting to sort out the rights and responsibilities of the same-sex
family unit, but homophobia and (other -"isms") are often far more powerful than
practicality.
16. For potential solutions, see Vincent C. Green, Same-Sex Adoption: An
Alternative Approach to Gay Marriage in New York, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 399 (1996);
Rosato, supra note 3.
17. For a critique of arguments by both opponents and proponents of same-sex
marriage and a theory that advocates social and legal support for all children, see
Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of
Same-Sex MarriageBoth Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573 (2005).
18. For an argument that LGBT families should explore how the definition of
the traditional nuclear family is used to deny non-conforming families benefits and
privileges, see Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 40207.
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adoption; it could also be the legal stepping stone to a more
expansive definition of what types of child-adult relationships
should be entitled to legal recognition by focusing on the rights
and well-being of children. 19
I.

Equal Protection Law and Sexual Orientation
A. Basic Equal ProtectionLaw

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "no State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."20 Most legislation is
presumed valid and will be upheld if the classification delineated
21
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
As this test is traditionally understood, it is extremely deferential
to the government's stated interests, and the means chosen to
achieve those interests need only be reasonable; even to the extent
that "legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact finding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data."22 Further, the means chosen need only be a
23
reasonable way to accomplish the government's objectives.
Although the rational basis standard has been described more
recently as having two distinct versions, the "weak and strong
approaches," most cases decided under rational basis review are
24
decided in favor of the government.
19. In 2006, Ariela Dubler wrote an excellent essay based on the historical
lessons of McLaughlin v. Florida,379 U.S. 184 (1964), that offers two ways to view
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence could be viewed as either the
doctrinal precursor to same-sex marriage, or "[could] be seen as the beginning of
the extension of constitutional protection to a range of sexual practices that do not
fall within monogamous marriage. Or perhaps it will spawn both." Ariela R.
Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the
Road to Marriage,106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2006).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is binding on the
federal government via the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2 (1975) (explaining that the Court has always treated "Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection claims ... precisely the same as ... equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment").
21. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (holding unconstitutional a city's requirement that a proposed group home
for the mentally retarded obtain a special use permit because there was no rational
basis for believing the group home would pose a threat to the city's legitimate
interests).
22. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
23. Id. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the government's
chosen methods are in fact unreasonable. Id.
24. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 514-
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When a statute classifies on the basis of race, alienage, or
national origin, however, the laws are subject to the highest level
of review-strict scrutiny-and upheld "only if they are suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 25 A court must
determine that the government's purpose is "compelling" and the
law must be "necessary" as a means of accomplishing that
purpose. 26 In other words, the law must be the least restrictive or
least discriminatory alternative. 27 Few government regulations
28
withstand this most rigorous level of scrutiny.
In between rational basis and strict scrutiny falls an
intermediate level of review applicable to, for example, gender
classifications and non-marital children. 29 Under intermediate
scrutiny, the classification must be "substantially related to a
sufficiently important government interest."30 While not to the
same extent as under strict scrutiny, few government regulations
31
withstand intermediate scrutiny.
Although the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to extend
strict or intermediate scrutiny to government classifications based

17 (2004). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996) (striking down, in a
rare deviation from typical rational basis review, Colorado's Amendment 2 because
it was impermissibly driven by animus against gays and lesbians).
25. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
26. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2007)
(discussing the history and practice of strict judicial scrutiny).
27. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529 (1997) ("Under strict scrutiny a law is upheld if it is
proven necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The government...
must show that it cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory
alternative."); R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal
Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating
Questions of Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279,
1283 n.19 (1994) ("At strict scrutiny, the Court applies the compelling
governmental interest, direct relationship, and least restrictive alternative
legislative fit test.").
28. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627. The burden of proof under strict scrutiny is on
the government. See id; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
29. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)
(holding that failure to provide support rights for nonmarital children violates
equal protection).
30. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. The government also has the burden of
proof under intermediate scrutiny. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to the denial of a father's claim for the wrongful
death of his child because the father had not legitimated the child).
31. City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 453-54.
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on mental disability, 32 age, 33 or poverty, 34 it has yet to address
what level of scrutiny is applicable to classifications on the basis of
35
sexual orientation.
The vast majority of federal and state courts to address the
level of scrutiny for sexual orientation discrimination apply
rational basis review. 36 This selection of the lowest level of review,
with rare exception, ensures that a gay or lesbian plaintiffs equal
protection challenge will be unsuccessful. 37 Under rational basis
review, courts have denied gays and lesbians the benefits and
privileges exercised by heterosexuals in a host of areas including
adoption,38
high-level
security
clearance, 39
bankruptcy
4
0
protections,
and the most contested issue today, same-sex
marriage.41
The next Section will discuss the rationales government
defendants advance when denying same-sex couples the right to
marry and prohibiting gay and lesbian adoption. In most federal
and state courts, these rationales have been sufficient to
withstand rational basis review.

32. Id. at 442 (declining to use a heightened standard of review for
classifications based on mental disability).
33. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (declining to use a
heightened standard of review for classifications based on age).
34. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining
to use a heightened standard of review for classifications based on poverty).
35. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (declining to designate a
specific standard of review to classifications based on sexual orientation, but
analyzing a challenge to Colorado's constitutional amendment denying certain
rights to homosexual persons under rational basis review). The Court in Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overturned the criminalization of homosexuality in a
Texas statute, but did so based on the right to privacy and fundamental liberties of
the Due Process Clause. The Court referred to the equal protection claim as
"tenable" but did not address what level of scrutiny would apply. Id. at 574-75.
36. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-26 (applying rational basis review to a
challenge of Colorado's constitutional amendment denying certain rights to
homosexual persons); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (applying rational
basis review to an action brought by same-sex couples against New Jersey state
officials' actions in refusing to issue them marriage licenses).
37. But see Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-26 (striking down a Colorado amendment
that would have precluded governmental protection against discrimination based
on sexual orientation after applying rational basis review).
38. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004).
39. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1990).
40. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
41. E.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (denying
marriage rights).
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B. Same-Sex Marriageand Adoption Ban Rationales
In the legal battles over same-sex marriage, the most
frequent arguments advanced by government defendants are
based in traditional notions of marriage between a man and a
woman. This Essay will briefly explain the three major
42
arguments.
1.

Biology

The first argument is deeply rooted in notions of procreation
and biological connections. The biology argument asserts that
marriage should be limited to a man and a woman, not two men or
two women, because only a man and a woman can produce a child
that is biologically related to both of them. 43 For example, in
Andersen v. King County,4 4 in which gay and lesbian plaintiffs
challenged Washington's Defense of Marriage Act 45 as a violation
of Washington's privileges and immunities clause, 46 the state
argued that "partners in a marriage are expected to engage in
exclusive sexual relations with children the probable result and
paternity presumed." 47 The court found this rationale to be related
to a legitimate state interest because, absent third party
involvement, no other relationship has the potential to create a
48
child that is biologically related to both parents.
42. For a general overview of these arguments, see Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring
of the Lines: Children and Bans on InterracialUnions and Same-Sex Marriages,76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2752 (2008). For academic arguments supporting these
government rationales, see Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public
Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 773-74, 779-80 & 790-91 (2002);
Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771,
797-99 (2001). But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006) ("The State
does not argue that limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman is needed
to encourage procreation or to create the optimal living environment for children.").
43. See Gallagher, supra note 42, at 774.
44. 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
45. In 1998, Washington adopted the state's Defense of Marriage Act, limiting
marriage to unions between a man and a woman, and prohibiting marriage for
couples other than one male and one female. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (1998).
46. Courts interpreting Washington's privileges and immunities clause apply
the same constitutional analysis as that applied to the U.S. Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 972. Plaintiffs also challenged the state's
Defense of Marriage Act as a violation of privacy and the state's equal rights
amendment. See id. at 973. The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the
application of a suspect or quasi-suspect classification to gays and lesbians,
applying the deferential rational basis standard of review to the state legislature's
decision to allow only opposite-sex couples to marry. See id. at 975.
47. Id. at 982.
48. Id.; see Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D, Fla. 2005) (noting
the state's argument that Florida's Defense of Marriage Act "fosters the
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Legitimacy

The second rationale invoked by government defendants in
same-sex marriage challenges is related to the first, but focuses on
encouraging the rearing of a biological child within a marriage, as
49
opposed to outside of it.
By this rationale, legislatures are
justified in encouraging marriage for opposite-sex couples who
have relationships that result in children, because it is preferable
to having children raised by unmarried parents. 50 A variation on
this argument is that states must encourage opposite-sex marriage
because these couples' sexual relations can lead to pregnancy
accidentally, something that cannot happen in same-sex
relations. 51 The unique heterosexual ability to accidentally have
children creates a state incentive to encourage and promote
52
stability in marriage for these children.
In Hernandez v. Robles, the same-sex marriage ban challenge
in New York, the state's highest court clarified this point: "the
Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not
apply with comparable force to same-sex couples... [whoI can
become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other
technological marvels, but they do not become parents as a result

development of relationships that are optimal for procreation, thereby encouraging
the 'stable generational continuity of the United States."' (citation omitted));
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003); Conaway v. Dean, 932 A.2d 571, 630-31 (Md. 2007); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). The court in Andersen, 138 P.2d at 980-85, also agreed
with the state that the need to resolve conflicting rights and obligations of same-sex
couples in relation to a child is another rational basis for limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples. Although the procreation argument has been successful in
most jurisdictions, some courts have refused to find a same-sex marriage ban
rationally related to the encouragement of procreation and the raising of a couple's
biological child. In Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
a case involving a same-sex marriage ban challenge, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court found that denying marriage licenses to same-sex partners violated the equal
protection provision of the state constitution. Id. at 969. The court declined to
decide whether the statute infringed on a fundamental right or targeted a suspect
class because the state's policy was unconstitutional under the most minimal
rational basis inquiry. Id. As to the procreation argument, the Court found that the
statute failed to be rationally related to providing a "favorable setting for
procreation" because fertility and procreation are not prerequisites to obtaining a
marriage license. Id. at 961. The court reasoned that "it is the exclusive and
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting
of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage." Id.
49. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982.
50. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6-7; Andersen, 138
P.3d at 982.
51. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
52. Id.
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of accident or impulse. '53 The court theorized that this potential
accident or impulse on the part of opposite-sex couples creates a
greater danger that children will be raised in "unstable" homes
54
than with same-sex couples.
3.

Dual-Gender Parenting

The third argument invoked is that government defendants
have a legitimate interest in limiting marriage and adoption to
opposite-sex couples because "children thrive in opposite-sex

marriage environments.

. . ."55

In Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services,56 a challenge to
Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, the Eleventh Circuit
explained that the regulation was permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause because it was rationally related to the best
interests of Florida's adopted children by placing them in homes
with married heterosexual parents.5 7 Florida, the court found, had
a legitimate interest in encouraging the "optimal" family
structure, which included a home with both a mother and father,
because of the "vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in
shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual
role modeling. 58s The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that
Florida's role-modeling rationale was not rationally related to its
objectives of dual-gender parenting because the state allowed
single heterosexual persons to adopt, on the grounds that gays and
lesbians were not similarly situated to heterosexual singles. 59 The
court explained that, unlike gays and lesbians, heterosexual

53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goodridgev. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) found that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
was not related to ensuring that children are raised in an "optimal" setting with
one parent of each sex, because the demographics of the U.S. family make it
difficult to describe the average family and the state offered no evidence to show
that denying same-sex couples marriage would increase the number of opposite-sex
couples raising children. Goodridge at 963. The court also added that extending
marriage to same-sex couples would offer a more stable family structure for the
children in those households. Id. at 962-64; see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
884 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting the argument that Vermont public policy favored oppositesex parents as "patently without substance" in light of statutes permitting samesex adoption and offering legal protections in the event of dissolution of same-sex
relationships).
55. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983.
56. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at 819-20.
58. Id. at 818. For further background on these arguments, see Ball, supra note
42, at 2752-56.
59. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 821-22.
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singles have a greater probability of eventually establishing a
60
stable dual-gendered household.
These three arguments, successfully deployed against samesex couples, could play out very differently if and when a child is a
plaintiff in a same-sex marriage case, or in a suit in which the
child is denied a government benefit-like a wrongful death
recovery-of a non-biological gay or lesbian parent.
II. The Children of Same-Sex Couples as Plaintiffs
A. Identifying the Cognizable Injury
Courts and commentators have no problem identifying the
many benefits and privileges that children of same-sex families
are denied, even as they refuse to extend these protections to those
children by granting recognition of their parents' unions or
61
allowing gays and lesbians to adopt.
In Standhardt v. Superior Court of Arizona,62 a gay male
couple challenged Arizona's same-sex marriage ban as violative of
their fundamental right to privacy under both the federal and
state constitutions. 63 After holding that same-sex marriage was
not a fundamental liberty interest, and that gays and lesbians
were not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Arizona Court of
Appeals upheld the marriage provision because the state's
limitation on marriage was rationally related to its legitimate
interest of "encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the
stable environment traditionally associated with marriage." 64 The
court further explained that "although the line drawn between
couples who may marry (opposite-sex) and those who may not
(same-sex) may result in some inequity for children raised by
same-sex couples, such inequity was insufficient to negate
Arizona's link between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and
65
child-rearing."
Despite the acknowledged "inequity" that children of gay and
lesbian parents may experience, these children are relegated to
the sidelines even as the debate about their parents' rights and
60. Id. at 822.
61. E.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006) (noting that
"the record is replete with examples as to how the definition of marriage negatively
impacts gay and lesbian couples and their children" but nevertheless upholding the
constitutionality of the state's Defense of Marriage Act).
62. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
63. Id. at 454.
64. Id. at 461.
65. Id. at 463.

2010]

Three Pillarsof Exclusion

responsibilities simmers, percolates, boils, and often erupts in the
intense national battle over gay and lesbian adoption and samesex marriage. 66 It is rare for advocates to advance-and for courts
to consider-the potential rights and remedies of actual children of
gay and lesbian couples, as demonstrated by the lack of precedent
that the trial court noted in Varnum v. Brien,67 a challenge to
Iowa's same-sex marriage ban. 68 In Varnum, the children of samesex couples joined their parents as plaintiffs in asserting due
process violations of their fundamental rights to privacy and
familial association, as well as equal protection violations
stemming from the state's classification on the basis of legitimacy
status. 69 The court summarily dismissed the children's equal
protection and due process claims as lacking "any precedent
directly on point supporting the proposition that the minor
70
Plaintiffs may assert such 'derivative' claims."
Fortunately for the children in Varnum, their parents' push
for same-sex marriage was successful. 71 The Iowa Supreme Court
struck down the state's same-sex marriage ban, eliminating statesanctioned discrimination against both gays and lesbians, and
their children. 72 Yet, equal treatment is not a reality for most
children of gay and lesbian families in the United States. 73 At the
66. Benjamin D. Ledsham, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination,28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373,
2396 (2007) ("Children of same-sex couples exist and do so in growing numbers, but
they are often forgotten in a same-sex-marriage debate that focuses on the rights of
their parents and the propriety of the parents' own relationship.").
67. No. CV5965, 2007 WL 2468667 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007) (unpaginated)
aff'd, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
68. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862.
69. Varnum, 2007 WL 2468667.
70. There is a question as to whether such claims are "derivative" or in fact
direct claims by the child; for example, the children of the Varnum plaintiffs were
not parties to the appeal heard by the Iowa high court. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872
("The twelve plaintiffs comprise six same-sex couples who live in committed
relationships.").
71. Id. at 901.
72. See id. at 885 (finding that the challenged statute, which required that
marriage be between persons of the opposite sex, while neutral on its face, was
"targeted at gay and lesbian people as a class"); id. at 901 (noting that the de facto
ban on same-sex marriage was not in "the best interests of the children of gay and
lesbian parents, who are denied an environment supported by the benefits of
marriage"); id. at 906 (holding the statute to be in violation of the equal protection
provision of the Iowa Constitution). Note, however, that these protections extend
only to those existing under state law, not to federal protections that may hinge on
marital status. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 418 n.50.
73. Ledsham, supra note 66, at 2375 ("[W]hereas illegitimacy-based
discrimination against children of other-sex couples has largely faded from the
legal (and social) landscape, discrimination against children of same-sex couples
because of their parentage persists.").
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2000 Census, twenty percent of same-sex couples in the United
States are raising at least one child under eighteen.7 4 As of 2005,
an estimated 270,313 children were living in households headed
by same-sex couples. 75 Similar to Lucy's family in the opening
vignette, a majority of same-sex couples with children live in
states that provide no protection against sexual orientation
discrimination, 76 and these children are impacted by such
discrimination.
At the time of this Essay, the author was not aware of a
federal or state court that had considered the level of review
applicable to claims made by a child of same-sex parents.7 7 This
Essay submits that the legal arguments asserted in the same-sex
marriage and adoption cases would not withstand an equal
protection challenge if deployed to deny children of gays and
lesbians the benefits and protections equal to those awarded
children of opposite-sex couples. After all, such a case would not be
focused on the injuries to the parents and merely speculating on
the theoretical, indirect harms inflicted on the child of a gay or
lesbian claimant, as in StandhardtJ8 The court would be faced
with a child-standing in his or her own right-seeking recourse
for a cognizable state or federal constitutional injury. There are
strong precedents and policy rationales to elevate the level of
review for children of same-sex parents to intermediate scrutiny,
ensuring that disparate treatment by government defendants
would be struck down as violations of the equal protection of laws.
B.

Children'sRights Trump the Three Pillarsof Exclusion

A bedrock principle of equal protection law is that the
government may not harm individuals in minority groups by
erecting barriers that "make[] it more difficult for members of one
group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another

74. ADAM P. ROMERO ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., CENSUS SNAPSHOT: UNITED

STATES 2 (2007), http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/
USCensusSnapshot.pdf.
75. Id.
76. For a comprehensive look at state laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, see Human Rights Camgaign, Maps of State Laws &
Policies, http://www.hrc.org/about us/statelaws.asp (last visited May 11, 2010).
77. In the case In the Matter of Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651,667 (1995), the court
alluded to a potential equal protection violation of the children for failure to allow
adoption by non-biological unmarried heterosexual parents and non-biological
same-sex parents. The author would like to thank Shannon Minter for bringing this
case to her attention.
78. See supranotes 62-65.
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group." 79 Governments' rationales have been successful in
stemming the tide of same-sex equality, as evidenced in the
previous Section.80 When cast from a children's rights perspective,
however, it becomes far more difficult for the government to
defend the three major justifications-rooted in biology,
legitimacy, and dual-gender parenting. Well-established equal
protection jurisprudence, and children's rights precedents and
policies that exist outside the gay and lesbian rights context, are
principles that should also apply within the gay and lesbian rights
context. The next Section will return to the introductory vignette
to address the government rationales from the perspective of a
child of a same-sex couple in the context of a wrongful death claim
denial.81
Let's assume that Lucy sues a negligent defendant for the
wrongful death of Mary. Wrongful death claims focus primarily on
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff from the negligent, reckless, or
intentional death of a loved one.8 2 Increasingly, states allow
83
plaintiffs to recover for their emotional suffering as well.
Although the list of eligible plaintiffs varies by state, most limit
wrongful death recovery to the deceased's spouse, children,
parents, or siblings.8 4 Therefore, Lucy would not fit within the
statutory definition of a person entitled to file suit for her losses
resulting from Mary's death caused by the negligent defendant.
Legally, Lucy is not Mary's daughter. In fact, Sarah, Mary's samesex partner of eleven years, also would fail to qualify in the state
in which they live.8 5 Because Lucy's relationship with Mary fails to
79. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of

Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
80. See supra Part I.B.
81. For additional arguments challenging states' rationales from a child's
viewpoint, see Castic, supra note 3, at 9-13.
82. For further explanation of wrongful death statutes, see John G. Culhane, A
"Clanging Silence" Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911, 953-59
(2000-2001); Culhane, supra note 9; Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story
About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1
(2005). These articles do an excellent job of identifying the limitations of wrongful
death statutes.
83. See, e.g., Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 215 (N.J. 1980) ("[W]e know of no
public policy which would prohibit awarding damages that fully compensate.., for
the emotional suffering caused by the [wrongful] death.").
84. These statutory limitations prevent not only members of same-sex families,
but also members of many other family relationships that fail to conform to the
traditional nuclear family, from seeking recovery. See Culhane, supra note 82, at

942-63.
85. For a discussion of the first same-sex wrongful death victory, see Shannon
Minter, Expanding Wrongful Death Statutes and Other Death Benefits to SameSex Partners - Human Rights Magazine, http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/
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fit within the state's statutory definition, the defendant in our
fictional lawsuit can seek dismissal of Lucy's suit for failure to
state a claim. In subsequent motions, Lucy could challenge the
wrongful death statute as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because it denies her a benefit to which children of
opposite-sex couples are entitled. The defendant can invoke the
state's Defense of Marriage Act, or can simply raise the same
range of government rationales as in the same-sex marriage and
gay and lesbian adoption cases. 8 6 This Essay will briefly explore
why each rationale should fail when invoked to defeat Lucy's
wrongful death suit. It will do so by first analyzing the second
rationale of legitimacy, then turning to the dual-gender parenting
rationale, and finally evaluating the biology rationale.
1.

Legitimacy

The government's rationale that it should encourage childrearing within a marriage as opposed to outside of it has been a
successful rationale in most jurisdictions denying same-sex
couples marriage equality.87 Courts find that legislatures are
justified in encouraging marriage for opposite-sex couples who
have relationships that result in children because it is preferable
to having children raised by unmarried parents.8 8 This rationale
essentially encourages the 'legitimacy" of children. However, such
arguments of legitimacy/illegitimacy have been rejected as a
permissible basis for denying government benefits to children
raised by single or unmarried parents.8 9 Well-settled equal
protection law mandates that a state "may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them

expanding.html (last visited May 13, 2010); see also Culhane, supra note 82, at 976.
86. Procedurally, the equal protection challenge could be raised in different
ways; however, that is not the focus of this Essay.
87. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982
(Wash. 2006).
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89. This rationale often incorporates the argument that, insofar as it is
preferable for children to be raised by married couples, government actors are
justified in prohibiting same-sex marriage in order to encourage marriage for
opposite-sex couples. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25 (remarking that the institution of
marriage encourages opposite-sex couples "to stay together and raise a child or
children together"); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (noting that the state could
rationally support proscribing same-sex marriage on the grounds that "promoting
stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more."); Andersen, 138 P.2d
at 982 (asserting that "encouraging marriage for opposite-sex couples who may
have relationships that result in children is preferable to having children raised by
unmarried parents.").
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substantial benefits accorded children generally." 90 Children of
same-sex couples are in a similar position as the children in these
other marital status cases. Lucy would be denied a benefit
awarded other children because her two mothers are prohibited
from marrying each other, or obtaining some form of state
recognition of their relationship as a couple, and because there is
no state recognition of Lucy's relationship to her non-biological
mother, Mary.
A quick review of two non-marital status cases offers a clear
picture of the impact of such discrimination and why equal
protection jurisprudence eschews it. In fact, in these cases, the
Supreme Court has found claims alleging discrimination against
children because of their parents' marital status sufficient to apply
intermediate scrutiny. In 1967, Thelma Levy sued Louisiana on
behalf of five children seeking wrongful death recovery for the loss
of their mother, whose death was allegedly caused by her treating
physician. 9' The case also challenged a Louisiana statute which
92
denied a "right to recover" to children born outside of marriage.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the children's claims on the grounds that the children were not
"legitimate," insofar as "morals and general welfare . ..
discourage[] bringing children into the world out of wedlock," and
the Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari. 93 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the state court, finding the action to be
invidious discrimination when the child engaged in no action or
94
conduct relevant to the harm visited upon the mother.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 95 the Supreme
Court struck down a similar Louisiana provision that awarded
worker's compensation proceeds to a deceased worker's children
born of his marriage but denied those same proceeds to children
born outside of the marriage. 96 Henry Clyde Stokes died of workrelated injuries and, at the time of his death, was living with
Willie Mae Weber. 97 Stokes and Weber were not married, but
90. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). For further discussion of the
illegitimacy cases and children of same-sex families, see Ledsham, supra note 66.
91. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968).
92. Id. at 70.
93. Id. (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)).
94. Id. at 72; see also Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968) (invalidating a Louisiana statute that barred recovery for damages to the
mother of an illegitimate child while allowing recovery to the parents of a
legitimate child under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
95. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
96. Id. at 164.
97. Id. at 165.
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maintained a household of five children. 98 One of the children was
born to Stokes and Weber, while four others had been born to
Stokes and his wife, Adlay Jones, who had been committed to a
mental hospital years earlier. 99 Weber and Stokes' second child
was born shortly after Stokes' death. 100
The four marital children filed a worker's compensation claim
for their father's death, and Weber claimed compensation benefits
on behalf the non-marital children. 1° 1 However, under Louisiana
02
worker's compensation law, "unacknowledged illegitimate"'
children were not treated the same as children born to married
parents. 1°3 They were considered "other dependents" entitled to
recovery only if there were not enough surviving dependents in
line before them to exhaust the maximum benefits. 10 4 The four
children from Stokes' marriage were awarded the maximum
allowable amount, leaving the two children from the non-marital
partnership between Stokes and Weber with nothing. 10 5 In
reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that, consistent with prior cases, treating children born
outside of marriage differently than those born inside it is
impermissible discrimination. 10 6 "An unacknowledged illegitimate
child may suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child born
within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged."'1 7 The
Weber Court further explained its position:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head
of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 165-66.
102. Id. at 167-68. It was not possible for Stokes to acknowledge his two
children with Weber because Louisiana prohibited acknowledgment of children
whose parents were incapable of marrying at the time of conception. Id. Stokes
remained married to Jones, making it impossible for him to marry Weber. Id. at
171 n.9.
103. Id. at 167-68 (noting that the Louisiana law allowed 'legitimate children
and acknowledged illegitimates" equal recovery, while relegating "unacknowledged
illegitimate children" to a lesser status).
104. Id. at 168.
105. Id. at 167.
106. Id.at 169.
107. Id.
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the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjustway of deterring the parent. 108

There is much to glean from jurisprudence on the rights of
marital and non-marital children applicable in the context of
children raised in same-sex families. The Weber Court supported
its decision by explaining that Stokes had as much affinity for his
non-marital children as he did for his four children born within his
marriage, and that all of his children had lived with him and were
"equally dependent upon him for maintenance and support." 10 9
The same arguments support recognizing the relationship between
Lucy and Mary. To deny Lucy the hard-earned benefits derived
from her non-biological parent because of moral disdain for her
lesbian parents' conduct runs contrary to the basic precepts
delineated in the non-marital status cases. 110 Whatever the
popular opinion of gays and lesbians may be, even if it includes
elements of moral disdain, it cannot justify discrimination against
their children.
Furthermore, if the equal protection jurisprudence for
children of same-sex parents is consistent with that in the nonmarital children cases, the government rationales will be subject
to intermediate scrutiny, and thus must be "substantially related
1
' This is a
to a sufficiently important government interest.""
hurdle that even the most anti-gay state is unlikely to surpass
when faced with a child plaintiff with demonstrable and
compensable injuries.
2.

Dual-Gender Parenting

The second rationale government defendants invoke to
prevent same-sex marriage and gay and lesbian adoptions is that
there is a legitimate government interest in limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples because "children thrive in opposite-sex
marriage environments."11 2 As explained below, this is a faulty
rationale to deny a child of same-sex parents wrongful death
recovery.

108. Id. at 175 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 169-70.
110. See id. at 164; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work
nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation."); Graham, supra note 2, at 1031-32 (discussing the rights of same-sex
parents and their children as compared to other classes).
111. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
112. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006); see supra Part
I.B.3.
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In Lofton v. Secretary of Children & Family Services,113 gay
foster parents and guardians challenged Florida's ban on gay
adoption. 114 In addition to a fundamental right to privacy and due
process claim, the plaintiffs argued the state ban violated equal
protection law because the prohibition on gay and lesbian adoption
was not rationally related to Florida's interest in furthering the
best interests of adopted children. 115 As to the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim, the Eleventh Circuit held that the adoption ban
was permissible because it passed the rational basis test. 116 The
Florida statute assured that adopted children's best interests were
met by placing them in homes with married, heterosexual
parents." 7 According to the court, Florida had a legitimate
interest in encouraging the optimal family structure that included
a home with both a mother and father because of the "vital role
that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender
8
identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.""
The gender-based assumptions that women and men bring
and
parental
differences
to
child-rearing
inherent
responsibilities-differences which render same-sex couples
incapable of successful child-rearing by comparison-rest on
gender stereotyping, as scholars have explained. 119 This gender
stereotyping is more focused and acute when viewed from the
perspective of a child plaintiff.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "the test for
determining the validity of a gender-based classification.., must
be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
113. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
114. Id. at 807-08.
115. Id. at 820. If found, the lack of a rational relationship would fail even the
lowest level of scrutiny under the rational basis test. See supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text. Since there were no fundamental rights at stake and the foster
parents were not considered a suspect class, the court used rational basis. Lofton,
358 F.3d at 817-18.
116. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818-26.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 818.
119. It is well established in academic literature that homophobia and sexism
are intricately linked. For a thorough discussion of stereotyping and homophobia,
see SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXIsM 27-43 (1988). When a
young teenage boy is called a "faggot" on the sports field, in the school yard, or in
the hallways of our educational institutions, because the boy is "effeminate," or
"throws like a girl," both the perpetrator and the victim of such insults, and those
witnessing these exchanges, experience homophobia as a weapon of sexism. Id. The
message these acts convey is that the teenage boy is expected to retreat to a socially
acceptable gender role and behavior. Id. The boy is expected to perform his male
gender role with masculinity-to throw like a boy and to act like a boy. Id. The
alternative is bleak: he will face ostracism, ridicule, and disdain. Id.

2010]

Three Pillarsof Exclusion

males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether
the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic
notions." 120 Such gender distinctions are also subject to
intermediate scrutiny.
To deny Lucy wrongful death benefits because she does not
have both male and female parents, but instead two women as
parents, is to treat her differently based on the idea that there are
inherent and static qualities and characteristics to child-rearing
that are uniquely male and uniquely female. 121 The Lofton court
did not explain or list any inherently "female" or "male" qualities
but simply presumed that these qualities existed and were
122
necessary to raise (as opposed to conceive) a child.
Perhaps the court was implying that men cannot provide a
nurturing environment for children, or that women cannot provide
adequate financial support or teach male children about sex and
sports. These types of assumptions fall squarely within the gender
stereotyping that has been deemed impermissible in other
contexts in equal protection jurisprudence, including decisions
about parenting. 123
In Caban v. Mohammed, 124 the Supreme Court analyzed a
New York law that permitted an unwed mother to block the
adoption of her child by denying consent to the potential

120. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982); see also
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996) (discussing gender
stereotyping in military academies); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(discussing gender stereotyping of women members of the U.S. Armed Service and
the dependency, or non-dependency, of their husbands); Ball, supra note 42, at
2765 (discussing Supreme Court cases that prohibit gender stereotyping).
121. See Ball, supra note 42, at 2768 ('The normative notiona that optimal child
care depends on something unique about mothers as women conflates social
expectations and roles imposed on parents according to their sex/gender with
seemingly natural and intrinsic characteristics that distinguish women from men
(and vice versa)."); Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender
Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 725-48
(2003); Nan D. Hunter, The Sex DiscriminationArgument in Gay Rights Cases, 9
J.L. & POLY 397, 413 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 274-76
(1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS.
L. REV. 187, 188, 232 (1998).
122. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20.
123. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a state statutory
scheme requiring husbands to pay alimony to their wives, but not allowing
husbands to apply for alimony payments from their wives, was impermissible
gender-based discrimination); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(addressing social security benefits and discrimination toward mothers who choose
to work rather than remain at home).
124. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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adoptee(s). 125 The unwed father of a child was not afforded the
same consent-based objection to prevent the adoption of his
child.126 Abdeil Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together for
five years, during which they had two children. 127 After ending
their relationship, both Caban and Mohammed married different
people. 128 Caban challenged the gender-based distinction in the
law as an equal protection violation after his parental rights to his
children were terminated and the adoptions were granted to the
mother's then-husband. 129 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down
130
the statute as an unconstitutional gender-based distinction.
Mohammed argued that the distinction between unmarried
mothers an unmarried fathers was based on a fundamental
difference between them, because "a natural mother, absent
special circumstances, bears a closer relationship with her child"
than a father.1 3' The Court rejected this assertion, finding that
"maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance," and even if unwed mothers were closer to their
newborn children, "this generalization concerning parent-child
relations would become less acceptable as the age of the child
increased."' 32 The Court went on to "reject ... the claim that the
broad gender-based distinction of [the statute] is required by any
universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
133
every phase of a child's development."'
Although the same-sex marriage and adoption debate was
beyond the contemplation of the Court at the time Caban was
decided, the Court's central point applies to a dual-gender
household requirement. Gender stereotypes about the role of men
and women in parenting are impermissible rationales to deny
children of same-sex parents the equal benefits enjoyed by
children of opposite-sex parents. A government defendant faced
with a wrongful death claim by Lucy would have a formidable
challenge in offering a important government interest that does

125. Id. at 385.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 382.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 394.
131. Id. at 388.
132. Id. at 387-89. The author would like to thank Pamela Karlan for bringing
her attention to this case.
133. Id. at 389.
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not stereotype the child-rearing and parenting abilities of her two
mothers.134
3.

Biology

Finally, denying a child wrongful a death because the child
does not have both male and female biological parents is
unpersuasive as well when pitted against the best interest of a
child seeking damages for the loss of a non-biological parent.
First, courts (and society) prioritize biology in defining
parenting responsibilities, yet biology is not the sole determinant
of who may be a parent. As the modern U.S. family changes,
"[b]iology is increasingly called upon to share its privileged status
as the foundation stone of parenthood with caregiving and other
social values."'135 The understanding that biology is not the sole
criteria to be a parent is reflected in state recognized parent-child
37
136
relationships, such as the marital presumption rule, adoption,
38
and the legal recognition of stepparents and de facto parents.
Although states rely heavily on biology to regulate and enforce

134. It is problematic for a state to presume that there are gender specific
prerequisites to parenting that are in fact demonstrated in heterosexual U.S.
households with children. As Caban demonstrates, outside the context of gay or
lesbian relationships, government attempts to regulate the intimate decisions of
families in order to compel parents to conform to gender stereotypes would likely
fail under equal protection law, but are also likely to be struck down under the
fundamental right to privacy. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (allowing a
state law imposing alimony obligations based on gender to be challenged on equal
protection grounds); Pierce v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is
cardinal with us that custody, care and nurture of a child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (noting that the 'liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children").
135. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125,
126 (Supp. 2006). See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (finding that a
biological link, by itself, does not merit "substantial protection" under the Due
Process Clause in the way that demonstrating a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood and child-rearing would); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (denying a biological father's due process challenge to the mother's
husband's adoption of his child). For a discussion of the de-emphasis of the
biological connection and focus on other factors, see Alice Ristroph & Melissa
Murray, Disestablishingthe Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010).
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (2009) (establishing a presumption of
paternity if a man is married to the child's mother).
137. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 259.59 (2008) (establishing legal rights under
adoption).
138. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (2008) (granting custody rights to
individuals, including stepparents and de facto parents when in the "best interests
of the child").
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parental and financial obligations to children, this biological link
is an unnecessary proxy for the policing function when addressing
the relationship between Lucy and her non-biological parent,
Mary. When there is a non-biological parent affirmatively seeking
parental responsibility-financially, psychologically, and sociallybiology should not be a prerequisite. 139 Even if the couple splits up,
the steps taken by gay and lesbian couples to become parents of a
child offer sufficient indicia to assess whether the non-biological
parent assumed parenting rights and responsibilities of a child.
More importantly, the biology argument is unrelated to the
very purpose of state benefits and provisions designed to protect
children. The purpose of the wrongful death claim, as an example,
is to provide recovery for emotional, financial, and caretaking
losses to the child in the household. 140 These losses are present
whether the parents are in same-sex or opposite-sex unions. To
deny the child recovery based on the absent biological link is
contrary to the basic principles of wrongful death actions and tort
law-that the dependent child is placed in the position she would
have been in had the tortious act never occurred. To ignore the
eleven year parent-child relationship between Lucy and Mary
leaves Lucy without financial compensation for her losses (both
economic and emotional) and grants the negligent defendant a
windfall.
This Essay selected wrongful death as an example; however,
there are many government benefits that could be similarly
challenged. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in its
ruling striking down its state's same-sex marriage ban:
We fail to see any legitimate governmental purpose in
disallowing the child of a deceased same-sex parent survivor
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act or Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act when children of married parents
would be entitled to such benefits. Nor do we see the
governmental purpose in not affording the child of a same-sex
parent, who is a volunteer firefighter or first-aid responder,
the children of married parents
tuition assistance when
41
receive such assistance.
139. See Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection:
Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J.
PUB. L. 289, 307 (2008) ("[States are beginning to give lesbian and gay couples
quasi- or actual marital status that entitles these couples to be treated the same as
married couples under all aspects of family law. For example, a handful of states
apply marital presumptions to children born to couples in civil unions and permit
lesbians and gays to adopt their partner's child just as a stepparent would."
(footnotes omitted)).
140. See supranote 82 and accompanying text.
141. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006).
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Considering the many state and federal benefits denied
children of same-sex couples, it is shocking that there has not yet
been a reported case. In the coming years, a situation may arise in
which a plaintiffs attorney accepts a case, believing it to be a basic
tort claim or administrative appeal, and unwittingly (or not) steps
into a future foundational constitutional case for sexual
orientation discrimination and children's rights law.
Conclusion
There are certainly upsides and downsides to pursuing the
rights of children of gays and lesbians that must be thoroughly
vetted. On one hand, it may be too conservative; on the other, law
tends to be incremental. On one hand, a focus on the rights of
children of gays and lesbians offers another avenue to push for
equality by recognizing that discrimination extends to individuals
because of their relationships to gays and lesbians; on the other, it
may be viewed as bootstrapping or an end-run around lawful
discrimination against gays and lesbians. On one hand, a childcentered approach to gay and lesbian issues may contribute to the
children's rights movement, 142 or to the redefinition of what childadult relationships warrant legal recognition in some capacity; on
the other, the same principles developed to seek recourse for these
children could be used to challenge the rights of gay and lesbian
parents. 143 On one hand, gay and lesbian rights advocates could be
vilified for "exploiting" their children; on the other, the failure to
advocate for the rights of children of gay and lesbian parents can
be faulted as well.
The concerns raised about a children's rights approach do not
change the reality that children of same-sex couples are denied
financial, psychological, and social benefits enjoyed by children of
opposite-sex couples. As the non-marital status cases clearly
demonstrate, the government cannot deny non-marital children
the same protections afforded marital children because of morality
and/or invidious animus. The same principle should apply to

142. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of
Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV.
358 (1994); Barbara Barrett Woodson, "Out of Children's Needs, Children'sRights':
The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321 (1994).
143. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvare, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage
and Family: Same-Sex Marriage and Its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
135, 171 (2005) (explaining how the focus on adults in same-sex marriage cases
"flies in the face of the enormous public and private efforts currently underway to
strengthen marriage-efforts that are largely premised on the widely accepted
relationship between healthy children and stable families.").
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children of gay and lesbian parents, particularly after Romer v.
Evans,14 4 prohibiting animus-driven legislation that targets gays
and lesbians, and Lawrence v. Texas, which, although a
fundamental right to privacy case, calls into question purely
decisions
related to sexual
government
morality-driven
orientation.145
The children of same-sex couples face disparate treatment in
relation to their parents' sexual orientation because of the heteronormative pillars of biology, legitimacy, and dual-gender
parenting. None of these pillars, standing alone, or in operation
with one another, justify the exclusion of children of gay and
lesbian families from the equal protection of the law.

144. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court declared
Colorado's Amendment 2 unconstitutional, failing a rational basis test under equal
protection law because it was not rationally related to any legitimate state
interests and was impermissibly driven by animosity toward gays and lesbians.
145. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Supreme Court struck down
Texas' sodomy statute as an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, reversing its holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986). The Court dismantled the underpinnings of Bowers, including the
assertion that anti-sodomy laws have "ancient roots," and explained that despite
deep religious and moral beliefs that condemn homosexual sodomy, the majority
may not use the power of the state to enforce its views on society through criminal
law enforcement. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.

